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I. INTRODUCTION
To avoid reaching incorrect verdicts as a result of insuffi-
cient evidence, courts generally require witnesses to testify to all
relevant facts within their knowledge.' Two important exceptions
to this general rule,' incompetency and privilege, rest on very
different rationales. Developed at common law to exclude unreli-
able evidence, rules of competency disqualify certain untrustwor-
thy witnesses from testifying. 3 To promote extrinsic public poli-
cies, however, privileges excuse competent witnesses from
providing what may be highly probative and reliable evidence.'
1.
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public. . . has a right to every man's evidence. When we come
to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assump-
tion that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving
and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
688 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
2. Most exceptions to the general rule of admitting all relevant evidence actually aid
in the determination of truth by excluding evidence that is unreliable or calculated to
prejudice or mislead. Prominent examples of such rules of exclusion include the hearsay
rule, the opinion rule, and the rule rejecting proof of bad character as evidence of crime.
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
3. Examples include the rules disqualifying witnesses because of mental incapacity,
conviction of crime, or interest in the outcome of the litigation. Most common law rules
of competency have been abandoned, existing today merely as grounds for impeaching a
witness's testimony. See generally B. JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 20.1-.61 (6th ed. S.
Gard 1972); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 61-71; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 483-
620. At one time, spouses were disqualified from testifying for or against one another on
the basis of incompetency. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 2, §§ 66-67; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2334.
4. E.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 72; Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and
Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-15 (1956);
Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1358-
60 (1973).
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In the past decade there have been calls for legislative or judi-
cial' recognition of a parent-child privilege,' similar to the mari-
Most privileges are designed to foster important relationships. Among this group of
privileges, the marital, lawyer-client, priest-penitent, and doctor-patient privileges tradi-
tionally have been recognized by American courts. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §
2285; Louisell & Crippin, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REV. 413, 414 (19561. The
marital and lawyer-client privileges are recognized today in all fifty states. See Note,
Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the
Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 VA. L.
REV. 359, 360 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Modern Trend]; Note, Functional Overlap
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1227 & n.7 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
Functional Overlap]. The priest-penitent privilege is recognized by statute in all but four
states. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 77. Approximately three-fourths of the states
recognize some form of doctor-patient privilege. Id. § 98; see Chafee, Privileged
Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the
Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943).
Several new interpersonal privileges have appeared in recent years. Approximately
half the states now recognize a newsman-source privilege. See Murasky, The Journalist's
Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REv. 829, 871 n.134 (1974). Other less
widely recognized privileges include those protecting confidential communications
between psychotherapists and patients, see, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1010-1028 (West
1966 & Supp. 1979); accountants and clients, see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749
(Supp. 1979); school guidance counselors and students, see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 806 (Supp. 1979); and social workers and clients, see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §
4508 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
Privileges promoting other public policies include the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, U.S. CONST. amend. V, and the governmental secrets privilege, see United States
v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); C. MCCORMIcK, supra note 2, §§ 106-113.
5. Commentators are in general agreement that the creation of new privileges is
properly the province of the legislature. See, e.g., C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 77;
Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175,
181 (1960). But see Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill., June 24,
1952), noted in 150 J.A.M.A. 1241 (1952); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89
N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976); In re Kryschuk & Zulynik, 14 D.L.R.2d 676 (Police
Magis. Ct., Sask. 1958).
6.
Edinburgh, 30th April 1838- [W]e had an example of that horrid piece of
nonsense, invented within these twenty years by the Court of Justiciary, and
called by the inventors "The option." The absurdity cannot possibly last long,
and for the edification of posterity it may be as well to tell 
what it was.
Some people think it cruel, and conducive to perjury, to compel parents or
children to give evidence against each other; . . . (1it occurred to some of the
judges, about twenty years ago, that, as the indulgence was granted solely from
delicacy to these relations, it was competent to them to reject it if they chose.
They therefore introduced The option, by which parents and children might hang
each other or not, just as they pleased. ...
This tissue of necessary nonsense is no part of the law of Scotland. The fear
of perjury,-a foolish principle, but one that was not unnatural to superstitious
barbarians, played on by cunning churchmen,-made our old law reject such
testimony altogether and without distinction. But the option, by which its
reception is made to depend on the pleasure or profligacy of each witness, is the
production of a few judges, not at all qualified to legislate on such a subject,
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tal privilege,' that would excuse parents from testifying against
their offspring." In contrast to the virtually universal recognition
within these few years.
The true principle is, to disregard relationship, except that of husband and
wife, as an objection to the competency of any witness ...
Bonaly, 11th May 1840.-... Four people were under trial for theft, and
two for reset [hiarboring a criminal]. A villain, who would have cut the throats of
all his relations for a shilling, was called as a witness by the prosecutor. It was
objected that, being the son of one of the thieves, he was not bound to give
evidence. . . . So I was obliged to disgrace the law by explaining to him the
respect paid to his sensibilities, and that in order to spare his filial piety, he
had the option of defeating justice by telling the truth or not, just as he chose.
No censure of this modern piece of judge-made legal nonsense could be severer
than the grotesque and villainous leer with which he said: "Odd! a' like that
hoption, ma Lord!" on which he retired amidst the laughter of the prisoners,
and the amazement of the jury, and saved the two resetters.
H. COCKBURN, CIRCUIT JOURNEYS 19-21, 69-70 (1888), quoted in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 2228.
7. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 66, 78-86; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
1, §§ 2227-2245, 2332-2341. Many of the criticisms this comment directs at the parent-
child privilege also apply to some degree to the marital privilege. The two relationships
are not identical, however, and an evaluation of the. marital privilege is beyond the scope
of this comment. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the marital privilege has received
less than universal praise. See, e.g., Wells v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ky.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861 (1978) (marital testimonial privilege described as "one of the
most ill-founded precepts to be found in the common law"); ONTARIO LAW REFORM COM-
MISSION, REPORT ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 141 (1976) (recommending abolition of the priv-
ilege) [hereinafter cited as ONTARIO EVIDENCE REPORT]; Comment, The Husband-Wife
Evidentiary Privileges: Is Marriage Really Necessary?, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 411 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges]; Comment, Questioning the Marital
Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern World, 7 CUM. L. REV. 307 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Medieval Philosophy].
8. A party has sought to prevent parental testimony in several reported cases. See In
re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745,
748-49, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 914-15 (1976); Cissna v. State, - Ind. App. -, -, 352 N.E.2d
793, 795 (1976); In re Mark G., 65 A.D.2d 917, 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978); In re A & M, 61
A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978); People v. Fitzgerald, - Misc. 2d -, 422 N.Y.S.2d
309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979). In only one reported case has a parent attempted to
prevent the testimony of a child on the ground of privilege. See Hunter v. State, - Ind.
App. -,... 360 N.E.2d 588, 598, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906 (1977). Numerous trial courts
have refused on policy grounds to hear testimony of children in divorce cases, even
though the children were legally competent, but these actions have been uniformly over-
turned on appeal. See, e.g., Buck v. Buck, 320 Mich. 624, 31 N.W.2d 829 (1948); Kreut-
zer v. Kreutzer, 226 Or. 158, 359 P.2d 536 (1961); Gregg v. Gregg, 469 P.2d 406 (Wyo.
1970).
Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181 P. 531 (1919), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 560
(1921), might also be viewed as a case in which a parent-child privilege claim was raised.
In Lindsey, a boy privately confessed to a juvenile court judge that he had killed his
father. The judge refused to testify at a subsequent trial, arguing that in his official posi-
tion he stood in place of the boy's parents. The court rejected this argument, noting that
a natural parent would be denied such a privilege.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has proposed a qualified privilege for family
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of the marital privilege,9 however, among common law jurisdic-
tions 0 only Idaho recognized a parent-child prigilegell until a New
members other than husband and wife. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT ON
EVIDENCE (1975). Several commentators have proposed various forms of privileges to pre-
vent parents from testifying against their offspring. See Coburn, Child-Parent Communi-
cations: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 DICK. L. REV. 598 (1970); Comment,
From the Mouths of Babes: Does the Constitutional Right of Privacy Mandate a Parent-
Child Privilege?, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1002 [hereinafter cited as Mouths of Babesi; Com-
ment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Child-Parent Privilege]; Comment, Confidential Communication Between
Parent and Child: A Constitutional Right, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 811 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Confidential Communication]; Comment, Recognition of a Parent-Child Testi-
monial Privilege, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 676 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Parent-Child Testi-
monial Privilege]; Comment, People v. Doe: Alternative Means of Protecting the Child-
Parent Relationship, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Alternative
Means].
9. Note, Spousal Testimony, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 259, 293-96 (1962); Modern
Trend, supra note 4, at 360; Alternative Means, supra note 8, at 223 n.11.
10. Civil law jurisdictions adopt widely differing approaches to the problem of testi-
mony by relatives. Germany recognizes an extremely broad family privilege extending to
"whoever is related directly by blood, marriage or adoption, or collaterally related by
blood to the third degree or by marriage to the second degree, to the accused .... " THE
GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 52, in 10 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES (H. Niebler trans. 1965). If such relatives choose to testify, they may refuse to take
an oath on their testimony. Id. § 63. In addition, any witness may refuse to answer ques-
tions which would place him or any of his relatives in danger of criminal prosecution. Id.
§ 55. Turkish law contains nearly identical provisions, THE TURKISH CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE arts. 47, 50, 53, in 5 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (1962), as
does Swedish law, except that a relative of a criminal defendant may not testify under
oath in Sweden, THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE ch. 36, §§ 3, 6, 13, in 24 THE
AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (A. Bruzelius & K. Thelin eds. & trans. 1979).
Similarly, under Japanese law, a witness can refuse to give testimony which will, or is
feared likely to, incriminate certain close relatives or others standing in a close personal
relationship to the witness. S. DANDO, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 280-81 (1965).
Israeli law prevents the calling of parent and child as witnesses against each other in
criminal proceedings. In civil cases the court must give its reasons for relying on the
testimony of a party's relatives, unless the testimony is corroborated. Livneh, The Law of
Evidence (Amendment) Law, 1968, 5 ISRAEL L. REV. 268, 272, 277 (1970). In French crim-
inal cases, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, and persons similarly related
by affinity to the accused may not testify, except to give general information, not under
oath, in the discretion of the court. THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 335-
336, in 7 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (G. Kock trans. 1964). In civil
cases, a witness cannot testify if he is a blood relation, or related by marriage in direct
line, to one of the parties. 0. BODINGTON, FRENCH LAW OF EVIDENCE 118 (1904). The
French rules appear to be rules of competence rather than privileges. See notes 2-4 supra
and accompanying text; Comment, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-
Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208, 210 n.16 (1961). Philippine law, on the other hand,
provides that no person can be compelled in a criminal case to testify against his parents or
other ascendants. RULES OF COURT 130, § 20(c) (Philippines), reprinted in THE REVISED
PENAL CODE 192 (Rex comp. & ed. 1972). The Soviet Union recognizes no privilege to refuse
testimony against close relatives; indeed, persons may be prosecuted for failure to report a
crime committed by a close relative. V. GSovSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 118-19 (1948).
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York appellate court did so on federal constitutional grounds.2
This comment, in three parts, evaluates the propriety of rec-
ognizing a parent-child privilege. First, scrutiny of the general
policy arguments advanced in support of the privilege and an
analysis of the privilege in light of Wigmore's conditions prece-
dent to establishing any interpersonal privilege illustrate that
sound public policy does not support recognition of a parent-
child privilege. Second, despite the reasoning of the New York
appellate court, the constitutional right of privacy does not
encompass a parent-child privilege. Finally, the impossibility of
fashioning an acceptable form of the privilege further demon-
strates that a parent-child privilege should not be recognized.
I. PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY
Proponents of a parent-child privilege advance four general
policy arguments supporting its recognition: (1) the public inter-
est in privacy; (2) the danger of destroying an important rela-
tionship; (3) the natural repugnance to compelling family mem-
bers to testify against one another; and (4) the invitation to
perjury or contempt that results from compelling testimony.
Some ancient civilizations also recognized evidentiary privileges for family members.
The ancient Athenian courts apparently could not compel relatives to testify. R. BONNER,
EVIDENCE IN ATHENIAN CoURrS 45 (1905). In ancient Rome, relatives apparently were
incompetent witnesses in civil cases, and could not be compelled to give testimony in
criminal cases except those charging treason, although they could testify if they so chose.
Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16
CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488, 490-91 (1928):
Continental legal systems recognizing broad privileges compensate by admitting
other kinds of evidence, such as hearsay statements. ONTARIO EVIDENCE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 3; Hammelmann, Hearsay Evidence, A Comparison, 67 LAW Q. REv. 67, 71
(1951). This is why Professor Quick concluded that "[tihe continental privilege ... not
to inform on members of the family unit is workable only because of continental proce-
dure." Quick, Self-Incrimination Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 3 WAYNE L. REV.
3, 5 (1956).
11. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1979) (enacted 1972). No reported case has interpreted
the Idaho parent-child privilege, and the statute's enactment has escaped the attention
of the commentators, see, e.g., 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 578 (13th ed. C. Torcia
1973 & Supp. 1979); Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1003; Child-Parent Privilege,
supra note 8, at 774; Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8, at 689.
"[Tihe practice of the Chancellor and of the common law judges never disqualified
any [family members] but the wife, and never privileged any but the wife." 8 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 1, § 2227.
12. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
1979]
182 University of Puget Sound Law Review
A. Invasion of Privacy
Commentators have defended a parent-child privilege by
arguing that privacy is the paramount interest privileges pro-
mote and that privileges are important barriers to official inva-
sions of privacy. 3 According to this view, privacy is an important
end in itself-an essential condition of political liberty and of
our very humanity." Recognition of privileges, allowing the indi-
vidual to strike a balance between total secrecy and total expo-
sure, indicates the high value a society places on privacy. 5 Privi-
leges protect privacy by recognizing a right to be let alone, a
right to unfettered freedom, in certain relationships, from the
state's coercive or supervisory powers."6 Because one of the most
important relationships is that between parent and child, courts
should respect the privacy of that relationship.
The mere assertion of a privacy interest, however, is not
sufficient justification for granting a parent-child privilege. In
general, privileges should not be recognized automatically when-
ever privacy is at stake. 7 Even though our society holds privacy
in high regard, not every privacy interest is sufficiently impor-
tant to warrant a privilege, which results in the loss of relevant
evidence. If privacy claims alone were enough justification for
privileges, virtually all testimony would be privileged. Indeed, an
invasion of privacy arguably occurs whenever a witness is sub-
13. "The rejection of a claim of privilege destroys the claimant's control over the
breadth of the audience receiving personal information as well as his control over the
timing and conditions of its release. Clearly, then limitations on testimonial privileges are
invasions of privacy." Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alter-
native to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 86 (1973); see Blous-
tein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 219, 222, 227-29 (1977);
Alternative Means, supra note 8, at 234.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8-63, 330-38 (1967); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475
(1968); Krattenmaker, supra note 13, at 88; Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal
World: Part II, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731, 750 (1957); Confidential Communication, supra
note 8, at 818-19.
15. See Bloustein, supra note 13, at 225-27; Krattenmaker, supra not 13, at 88.
16. Louisell, supra note 4, at 110-11; Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 772, 0
788, 791; see Black, The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a
Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45.
17.
]Plersonal privileges might be defended as important protectors of individual
privacy in modern society. Because claims of privacy can be asserted all too
easily, because the values sacrificed by a decision to uphold . . . privilege
claims concededly are substantial and because it is difficult to conceive of an
interest in privacy paramount to every imaginable countervailing societal goal,
such a defense commands careful scrutiny.
Krattenmaker, supra note 13, at 86.
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poenaed to testify, in that the witness is forced to disclose infor-
mation in his possession." Privacy is not an absolute right, but
rather must be balanced against other important societal inter-
ests, such as the fundamental interest in accurate adjudication."
B. Family Relationship
The next justification for a parent-child privilege closely
parallels the rationale of the marital privilege: that compelled
testimony threatens an important relationship. Actually, this
argument takes two forms: one supporting a general testimonial
privilege, 0 the other supporting a confidential communications
privilege." The first argument is that any testimony of one fam-
ily member against another will cause dissension in the family.
This argument primarily supports a testimonial privilege22 but
can also support a communications privilege.23 The second argu-
ment, used primarily to justify a communications privilege, is
that compelled disclosure discourages future communications. 4
18. "Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some
degree." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 n.* (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967)). See Henkin, Privacy and Auton-
omy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1429-30 (1974); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed
Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 483 (1977)
(granting privilege to all arguably private relationships "would swallow up much of the
law of evidence.").
19. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 19771; Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) ("[Olne aspect of a private matter is that it is private, that
is, that it does not adversely affect persons beyond the actor, and hence is none of their
business. When a matter does affect the public, directly or indirectly, it loses its wholly
private character, and can be made to yield when an appropriate public need is demon-
strated."); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2192 ("When the course of justice requires the
investigation of the truth, no man has any knowledge that is rightly private.")
20. A general testimonial privilege would excuse the witness parent from giving any
testimony against his child. This would be analogous to what Wigmore calls the "anti-
marital facts" privilege, which excuses spousal testimony. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§§ 2227-45.
21. A confidential communications privilege would prevent only testimony concern-
ing secrets confided by the child to the parent. This would be analogous to the marital
confidential communications privilege and all professional privileges.
22. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
1, § 2228; Ladd, Privileges, 1969 LAW. & Soc. ORD. 555, 558; Reutlinger, supra note 4, at
1359, 1370; Note, Privileges, 27 ARK. L. REv. 200, 202-03 (1973).
23. "Surely the compelled revelation of confidences entrusted in the privacy of the
marital relationship . . . would create at least as much 'dissension' in the home as would
any other adverse spousal testimony covered by the testimonial privilege." Reutlinger,
supra note 4, at 1370. See Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 787.
24. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2332; Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 1358-59,
1370, 1376; Comment, supra note 10, at 219, 231; Note, The Marital Testimony and
Communications Privileges: Improvements and Uncertainties in California and Federal
Courts, 9 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 569, 594 (1976).
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This argument rests on the assumptions that communication is
essential for a successful relationship and that confidentiality is
essential for communication.
The essence of the "dissension" rationale is that adverse
parental testimony is so traumatic to the child that the parent-
child relationship may be damaged irreparably. "' Some propo-
nents further suggest that compelled parental testimony will
result in strained relations among the entire family. 6 According
to this view, recognition of a parent-child privilege would con-
tribute to family harmony.
The dissension argument is unconvincing, however, because
court-compelled testimony simply is not a major source of
parent-child conflict. As Dean Wigmore states, responding to the
dissension argument in the context of the marital privilege, "The
peace of families does not essentially depend on this immunity
from compulsory testimony." Most statements of the dissension
rationale present an idealized and unrealistic picture of family
relationships. 2 Parent-child relationships are not inherently
peaceful and harmonious, 29 particularly in the typical delin-
quent's family,30 and would not be significantly more tranquil if
25. "[Clompelling a parent to testify against his child is to destroy the desired
intrafamilial rapport which is crucial to sustaining the child-parent relationship."
Coburn, supra note 8, at 616-17. See In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 434 n.7, 403 N.Y.S.2d
375, 380 n.7 (1978); Polier, The Future of the Juvenile Court, 26 Juv. JUST. 3, 7 (1975) (in
context of incorrigibility petitions); Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 787-90; Par-
ent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8, at 687; cf. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 610
(1979) (adversary hearing pitting parent against child prior to voluntary commitment of
child to mental hospital).
26. Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 789; Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege,
supra note 8, at 687.
27. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 66;
Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges, supra note 7, at 427.
28. See J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 46, 77 (1974).
29. J. BOSSARD & E. BOLL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 328-29 (4th ed.
1966); FAMILY IN TRANSITION 307-08 (A. Skolnick & J. Skolnick eds. 1971) (editors' intro-
ductory material) (parent-child relationship inevitably involves a conflict of interest and
impulse); T. GORDON, PARENT EFFECTIVENESS TRAINING 148 (1970) ("All parents encounter
situations when neither confrontations nor changes in the environment will change the
behavior of their child; the child continues to behave in a way that interferes with the
needs of the parent. These situations are inevitable in the parent-child relationship
because the child 'needs' to behave in a certain way even though he has been made aware
that his behavior is interfering with his parent's needs."); Cohen & Balikov, On the
Impact of Adolescence Upon Parents, in 3 ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 217 (S. Feinstein & P.
Giovacchini eds. 1974). See generally Davis, The Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict, 5
AM. Soc. REV. 523 (1940), reprinted in YOUTH AND SOCIOLOGY 93 (P. Manning & M.
Truzzi eds. 1972).
30. J. BOSSARD & E. BOLL, supra note 29, at 76; S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, DEUN-
QUENTS AND NONDELINQUENTS IN PERSPECTIVE 9-10, 16 (1968).
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the privilege were recognized. Furthermore, in a healthy parent-
child relationship, any detrimental effects of the adverse paren-
tal testimony could be lessened by explaining to the child that
the testimony was given only under compulsion.' Moreover, if a
parent could waive the privilege, as many proposed forms of the
privilege provide, recognition of the privilege perhaps could cre-
ate more dissension in the family. Recognition would increase
the child's expectation that the parent would not testify, even
though in some instances a parent might decide to testify after
an honest assessment of the child's best interests. Most impor-
tantly, however, the destructive effect on the administration of
justice of recognizing yet another privilege simply outweighs any
risk of possible lingering resentment in the child.
The second "relationship" argument suggests that the pri-
mary justification for a parent-child privilege is the child's essen-
tial need to communicate with parents in a confidential setting.32
According to this view, positive family interaction plays a signifi-
cant role in the prevention of delinquency and the development
of a well-adjusted child. 33 The therapeutic nature of parent-child
31. Cf. E. MORGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE XV (1921) (impossible to determine injury
from adverse spousal testimony); Comment, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife
in California, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 390, 413 (1931) (disclosure of marital confidences would
be neither anticipated by the parties nor regarded as a voluntary breach of confidence by
either). A child does not always think rationally, however, and might expect parents at
least to color the truth on his behalf. See Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 786
n.136.
32.
Child psychologists and behavioral scientists generally agree that it is essential to
the parent-child relationship that the lines of communication remain open and
that the child be encouraged to "talk out" his problems. It is therefore critical to
a child's emotional development that he know that he may explore his problems
in an atmosphere of trust and understanding without fear that his confidences
will later be revealed to others.
If we accept the proposition that the fostering of a confidential parent-
child relationship is necessary to the child's development of a positive system
of values, and results in an ultimate good to society as a whole, there can be no
doubt what the effect on that relationship would be if the State could compel
parents to disclose information given to them in the context of that confidential
setting.
In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 432-33, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978). See Mouths of Babes,
supra note 8, at 1010, 1019; Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 782-86; Confidential
Communication, supra note 8, at 829; Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8,
at 687; Alternative Means, supra note 8, at 234-35.
33. Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 782-84. But see A. JERSLD, THE Psy-
CHOLOGY OF ADOLESCENCE (2d ed. 1963):
While it is valuable for an adolescent to have someone with whom to share his
perplexities, it cannot always be assumed that persons who are most intimate
and confiding will face the hurdles of adolescent development most success-
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communications plays an important role in the child's emotional
growth." A child's knowledge that his parents may be compelled
to reveal confidential communications may seriously impair his
willingness to confide in his parents, thus preventing them from
providing guidance and support.3 Furthermore, according to this
theory the child most in need of parental guidance and family
interaction, a juvenile accused of crime or delinquency, will be the
very one whose confidences are revealed. 6
In the context of parent-child relations, however, the "com-
munications" rationale is unpersuasive. First, the sharing of
confidences between parent and child, although desirable, is not
nearly as crucial as proponents of a parent-child privilege sug-
gest. Although a successful marriage may require the mutual
surrender of individual privacy,3 parents and children usually do
not reveal themselves to each other to the same degree that hus-
bands and wives do.38 Shared confidences are not an invariable
fully. The person who is confiding may be one who is depending to an undue
degree on his parents and is prolonging his dependency on them.
Id. at 248-49.
34. Coburn, supra note 8, at 615-21 ("Therapy results from a child-parent relation-
ship when the disturbed person (child) is seeking help because he fears the social conse-
quences (punishment) of his behavior."); Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 784.
But see Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 425 n.3 (Alaska 1976) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring)
(" '[Elveryone' should not be able to assert a privilege merely because a conversation
with an acquaintance can arguably be styled as 'therapeutic.' ").
35. Coburn, supra note 8, at 619-20, 632; Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at
785; Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8, at 687.
36. Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 786-87.
37.
Lovers give themselves up to each other. They lay bare their innermost feel-
ings to each other, they are lewd and foolish with each other, they stand naked
before each other. Between themselves, there is no individual privacy, noth-
ing is held back. But the premise for giving up individual privacy in love is the
feeling that what is shared so intimately will not be broadcast to the world
at large. Indeed, this is the very condition for achieving intimacy. If love did
not promise, and most often provide for, such protected intimacy, falling in
love would be rare indeed.
Bloustein, supra note 13, at 222-23. See Gilbert, Self Disclosure, Intimacy and Communi-
cation in Families, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 221, 222 (1976) ("[Tihe most consistent inti-
mate disclosure occurs in the marital relationship."); Harper, Communication Problems
in Marriage and Marriage Counseling, 20 MARR. & FAM. LIVING 107 (1958); Louisell,
supra note 4, at 113; Comment, supra note 10, at 218.
38.
The Law Reform Committee also noted that other family relationships, such
as that between parent and child, were "equally close," yet it has never been
suggested that communications between parent and child should be privi-
leged. It is at least debatable whether the parent-child relationship is in fact
"equally close." A man and wife are joined together in one body; they remain
united for life. Intimate though the relationship between parents and their chil-
dren may be, it lacks that quality and degree which in the past has given
spouses a privilege denied their offspring.
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characteristic of successful parent-child relationships. Most of
the important societal functions of the parent-child relationship
can be fulfilled without the sharing of confidences.39 Second,
children may be less likely to confide in parents than in some
persons outside the family." Few jurisdictions, however, grant
privileges to other adults, such as teachers, school counselors, and
social workers," in whom many children routinely confide. This
illustrates that the crucial factor encouraging confidences by a
child is not a courtroom privilege but rather the trust the child
has in an understanding adult.2 Third, the absence of a privilege
Koroway, Confidentiality in the Law of Evidence, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 361, 388 (1978).
See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2337. But see Alternative Means, supra note 8, at 238
("Confidentiality would seem to be as essential to the parent-child relationship as it is to
the husband-wife relationship.")
39. The family community benefits a child in at least eight fundamental ways. The
family (1) serves as a culture carrier, (2) interprets and simplifies a complex world, (3)
disciplines, (4) protects, (5) gives freedom to explore, (6) helps solve problems, (7). provides
pleasant family living, and (8) develops personalities. 0. RrrCHIE & M. KOLLER, SOCIOLOGY
OF CHILDHOOD 85 (1964). But see Confidential Communication, supra note 8, at 828-29;
Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8, at 688 ("The role of parent ceases and
that of custodian begins when the parent can provide nothing beyond financial backing,
food, and laundry services.").
40. See E. DuvALL, FAMILY DEVELOPMENT 347 (4th ed. 1971) ("There is some normal
slackening off of telling parents everything as children get into their teens. Then it is
normal for intimate confidences to be shared first with close friends within the peer
group, and only secondarily with parents and other significant adults."); Gilbert, supra
note 37, at 225 (children learn not to disclose to parents perceived as nonaccepting);
Rosenheim, Privilege, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Offenders, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 660, 672
(1965) ("[Tleen-age students may wish devoutly that their unguarded remarks in bull
sessions with a congenial teacher never reach parental ears .. "); Smith, Youth-Adult
Conflict in American Society, in IssuEs IN ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 477-83 (D. Rogers ed.
1969); Note, Testimonial Privileges and the Student-Counselor Relationship in Secon-
dary Schools, 56 IOWA L. REV. 1323, 1337 & n.111 (1971) (potential disclosure to parents
is certain to inhibit the student from freely discussing matters of either a personal or
incriminating nature with the school counselor). Indeed, one authority argues that it is
often more valuable for adolescents to confide in an outsider than to try to confide in a
parent. A. JERSILD, supra note 33, at 250.
41. By 1973, only two states (New York and California) recognized a privilege for
social workers. Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the Psycho-
therapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1050, 1052 n.11 (1973). Thirteen states (Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and South Dakota) accord a statutory privilege to school counselors. Robinson, Testimo-
nial Privilege and the School Guidance Counselor, 25 SYRAcusE L. REv. 911, 918-24
(1974). From the student's perspective, however, most of these statutes offer very little
protection because they contain exceptions or limitations, or allow persons other than the
student to waive the privilege. Id. Three states (Connecticut, Montana, and Oklahoma)
apparently also protect communications to teachers under the same statutes. Id.
42. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 88 (communications to juvenile court judge); cf.
id. § 86 (marital communications); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2332 (marital commu-
nications); Krattenmaker, supra note 13, at 91 (confidential communications in general);
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does not prevent parents from keeping the vast majority of chil-
dren's confidences that are shared, 3 nor would recognition of a
privilege prevent parents from freely cooperating with police or
prosecutors outside the courtroom." Fourth, recognizing a privi-
lege probably would have little effect on whether children would
confide in their parents 45 because most children simply would be
unaware of the rule. 4 Fifth, if the ultimate rationale behind the
parent-child privilege is emotional adjustment in children and
the prevention of delinquency, 7 the only families to enjoy the
privilege's direct benefits would be those least likely, based on past
performance, to fulfill the privilege's promise. Parent-witnesses,
according to the communications rationale, would tend not to
have communicated effectively with their children in the past,
thus producing delinquent behavior.41 Suppressing their testi-
mony would do nothing to change this pattern in the future,
unless the mere recognition of a parent-child privilege would sig-
nificantly reduce juvenile crime-a dubious proposition.
Medieval Philosophy, supra note 7, at 318, 320 (marital communications).
43.
[Miost confidences are maintained without any reference to law at all.
Among other factors, a sense of good faith, the fear of reprisal or loss of face,
traditional practice, religious or ethical compunctions and the intricacies of
bureaucratic or organizational structure are important to the support of a sys-
tem of confidences. Law acts as only one influence among many.
Bloustein, supra note 13, at 224. See Note, Privileged Communications: A Case by Case
Approach, 23 ME. L. R.v. 443, 447-48 (1971).
44. Of course, this feature of limited efficacy, common to all privileges, is one reason
why privilege claims should be carefully scrutinized. Codes of ethics, however, backed by
disciplinary proceedings, deter professionals such as doctors or lawyers from breaking
confidences received in the professional relationship. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONsIaiLrrY Canon 4 (1977).
45. Cf. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence,'62
GEo. L.J. 125, 131 (1973) (marital communications privilege) (" [Tihis privilege actually
may not encourage communication between husband and wife .. "); Comment, The
Marital Privileges in Washington Law: Spouse Testimony and Marital Communications,
54 WASH. L. REv. 65, 89 (1978).
46. Cf. Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family
Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675, 677, 680-82 (1929) (lack of awareness of marital privilege
among laymen); Comment, supra note 31, at 412-13 (same). But cf. Reutlinger, supra note
4, at 1371-76 (no evidence of lack of awareness of marital privilege).
47. Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 783.
48. Id. at 783-84. On the other hand, the assumption that the parent-child relation-
ship is the principal factor in either the genesis or the prevention of delinquency may be
erroneous. Vincent, Expanding the Neglected Role of the Parent in the Juvenile Court, 4
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 523, 525-26 (1977).
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C. Natural Repugnance
Another unsatisfactory reason advanced for recognizing a
parent-child privilege is societal repugnance toward forcing par-
ents to testify against their offspring2 9 Recognizing that the"repugnance" argument underlies the marital testimonial privi-
lege, Wigmore notes the apparent inconsistency of granting a
marital privilege while not granting a similar privilege among
parents and children or among siblings.5s He correctly insists,
however, that the repugnance argument is nothing more than an
appeal to sentiment' inasmuch as it does not depend on any
direct and practical harm."2 Emotion alone should not obstruct
49.
Surely the thought of the State forcing a mother and father to reveal their
child's alleged misdeeds, as confessed to them in private, to provide the basis
for criminal charges is shocking to our sense of decency, fairness and propriety.
It is inconsistent with the way of life we cherish and guard so carefully and
raises the specter of a regime which encourages betrayal of one's offspring.
In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978). "This method of circum-
venting a juvenile's privilege against self-incrimination is repugnant to our system of jus-
tice and fair play." Coburn, supra note 8, at 617. See Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at
1009-10; Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 788-89; Parent-Child Testimonial Privi-
lege, supra note 8, at 687-88; Alternative Means, supra note 8, at 235.
50. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228, at 217 n.2; cf. Connor, The Qualification of
Defendant's Spouse as a Witness in Criminal Cases, 9 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272, 274 (1934)
(security and peace of the family jeopardized as much by damaging testimony of defen-
dant's child as by that of defendant's spouse).
51.
[Llitigation is not a game, and . . . the law can never afford to recognize it
as such; . . . the law, moreover, does not proceed by sentiment, but aims at
justice. This generality would perhaps never be disputed, but in actual argu-
ment the constant tendency is to confuse sentiment with reason. . . . Let us
face the fact that when a party appears in a court of justice, charged with
wrong or crime, the unavoidable and solemn business of the court and the law
is to find out'whether he has been guilty of the wrong or the crime; that the
state and the complainant have a right to the truth; and that this high and
solemn duty of doing justice and of establishing the truth is not to be
obstructed by considerations of sentiment, in this respect any more than in
others.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228, at 217-18. See Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privileges,
supra note 7, at 427.
In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978), provides a good example of the
confusion of sentiment with reason:
It would be difficult to think of a situation which more strikingly embodies the
intimate and confidential relationship which exists among family members
than that in which a troubled young person, perhaps beset with remorse and
guilt, turns for counsel and guidance to his mother and father. There is nothing
more natural, more consistent with our concept of the parental role, than that
a child may rely on his parents for help and advice. Shall it be said to these
parents, "Listen to your son at the risk of being compelled to testify about his
confidences?"
Id. at 429, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
52. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228. "The 'natural repugnance' one feels at the
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the administration of justice.5 3 Moreover, the suggestion that the
public is shocked and outraged at the thought of forcing family
members to testify against one another is questionable when
only a single state has enacted a parent-child privilege through
the legislative process.
D. Futility of Attempts to Compel Testimony
Finally, proponents of a parent-child privilege argue that
most parents called upon to testify either would refuse, even in
the face of contempt proceedings, or would commit perjury if
forced to testify?' Accordingly, recognizing the privilege would
result in no loss of reliable evidence and, by removing the temp-
tation of perjury, would advance rather than impede the ascer-
tainment of truth.5 5 Proponents further suggest that parents who
successfully commit perjury would teach children that punish-
ment can be avoided by further unlawful conduct."
These reasons, however, are insufficient to support recogni-
tion of a parent-child privilege. Basing recognition of privileges
merely on the stubborn refusal of some witnesses to testify would
necessitate granting privileges to most professional groups, to
distant relatives and even friends of criminal defendants. All
thought of one spouse being the tool of the other's defeat may not greatly outweigh the
'natural repugnance' one feels at letting a guilty person be shielded." Comment, supra
note 45, at 88 (footnote omitted).
53. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 86; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2228; see In re
Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Comment, supra note 10, at 231.
54. "[11f, as seems likely, the parents refuse to divulge their child's confidences, the
alternatives faced by the parents, i.e., risk of prosecution for contempt or commission of
perjury, could seriously undermine public trust in our system of justice." In re A & M, 61
A.D.2d 426, 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (1978).
There are two other courses of conduct open to the parent upon his being called
to testify against his child. . . . First, the parent may refuse to testify and,
therefore, be subject to contempt proceedings. A second alternative is for the
parent to deliberately lie and thereby assume the risk of subsequent criminal
prosecution for perjury. This latter course of conduct may be appealing to a
dedicated parent who is aware that there is no other practical or factual basis
for an adverse decision other than his testimony.
Coburn, supra note 8, at 628-29. See Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1010-11; Child-
Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 790-91; Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note
8, at 687.
55. Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 790-91; cf. Louisell, supra note 4, at
109-10 (European legal view that privileges help avoid perjury); Comment, supra note 10,
at 210 (courts may have created the marital privilege to protect against perjured
testimony).
56. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433 n.6, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 n.6 (1978); Coburn,
supra note 8, at 629; Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1011.
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these groups have risked contempt citations by refusing to tes-
tify57 and could be expected to refuse more frequently in the
future if a parent-child privilege were recognized for this rea-
son.5 Basing recognition on fears of perjury is equally unsound.
Perjury is fairly common, particularly in criminal trials.5 Under
our judicial system, however, a witness's demeanor and answers
under cross-examination, influenced by his oath of truthfulness,
generally enable the trier of fact to accurately gauge the credi-
bility of his testimony." Moreover, parents testifying as defense
witnesses might be no less tempted to falsify an alibi for their
child than to commit perjury as compelled prosecution witnesses.
Thus, the perjury rationale, if convincing, would seemingly
require disqualification of parents as witnesses rather than
recognition of a parent-child privilege."'
E. Wigmore's Test
In light of the foregoing discussion, a test proposed by
Wigmore may be used to evaluate the wisdom of recognizing a
parent-child privilege. The test sets forth four requirements that
must be satisfied before a privilege should be recognized:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
57. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1304 (1978) (journalist);
Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 944 (1972) ("obser-
vant and committed Jew"); United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass.
1961) (grand jury target's friend); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829 (1970) (psychotherapist); People v. Schultz, 380 Ill. 539, 44 N.E.2d 601 (1942)
(cousin of criminal defendant); In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889, cert.
denied, 59 N.J. 239, 281 A.2d 278 (1971) (Catholic nun and defendant's former teacher).
58. Professional groups in particular could be expected to urge members on the basis
of ethical considerations to refuse to testify. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 41, at 930-31.
59. "It is indeed unlikely that many men who commit serious offenses would balk on
principle from lying in their own defense. The guilty man may quite sincerely repent his
crime but yet, driven by the urge to remain free, may protest his innocence in a court of
law." Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 141 (1967); Hibschman, You Do Solemnly Swear! or That Perjury Problem,
24 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 901, 901 (1934); Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of
Perjury in Our Courts, 59 DICK. L. REV. 127, 127 (1955); Comment, Perjury: The Forgot-
ten Offense, 65 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 361, 361 (1974).
60. See 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 946; 5 id. § 1367; 6 id. §§ 1816, 1827, 1831.
The Supreme Court necessarily expressed confidence in this ability by permitting a
judge, in sentencing, to consider a defendant's perjury that the judge had observed dur-
ing the trial. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
61. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text; cf. Kelley v. Proctor, 41 N.H. 139,
142 (1860) (incompetency of wife based on fear of dissention and perjury).
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2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclo-
sure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposition of the litigation."
Although some courts and commentators have criticized Wig-
more's test,6 3 it is widely recognized as a useful means of evaluat-
ing proposed privileges."'
The proposed parent-child privilege probably satisfies the
test's first requirement. Although most communications between
parent and child are not as confidential as those, for example,
between priest and penitent,66 some sensitive parent-child dis-
cussions undoubtedly take place.66 A child's admission of wrong-
doing, the parent-child communication most likely to be the
object of court inquiry, generally would originate in at least an
implied confidence that it would not be disclosed.
The parent-child privilege, however, probably fails to satisfy
the test's second requirement. According to Wigmore, the second
requirement reflects the view that privileges are not intended to
protect secrecy as an end in itself, but are intended to guarantee
secrecy when without it the parties would not fulfill the essen-
tial demands of the relationship. 7 The attorney-client and
psychotherapist-patient relationships are perhaps the best ex-
amples of relationships in which secrecy truly is essential.6 s In
62. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285.
63. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 429-30 (Alaska 1976) (Dimond, J., concurring)
(would dispense with Wigmore's third requirement); Louisell, supra note 4, at 111 (criti-
cizes Wigmore for his emphasis on strictly utilitarian bases for privileges, arguing that
such bases are sometimes highly conjectural and defy scientific validation); Functional
Overlap, supra note 4, at 1229-31 (the test allows recognition of too many privileges).
64. See, e.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1953); United
States v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967, 969 (E.D. Ky. 1949); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 417
(Alaska 1976); State v. Bixby, 27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P.2d 689 (1947); Coburn, supra note
8, at 622-32; Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged
Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609, 611-12 (1964); Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 1359.
65. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 77; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§§ 2394-2396; Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 55
(1963).
66. Coburn, supra note 8, at 623; Alternative Means, supra note 8, at 236.
67. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2380a.
68. M. GuTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952) (psycho-
therapist-patient relationship); Note, supra note 40, at 1335 (attorney-client and psycho-
therapist-patient relationships as best examples of relationships in which confidentiality
is essential).
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these relationships, complete candor and full disclosure by the
client or patient are vital if the professional is to perform his
function effectively." In addition, much of the information
necessarily communicated in these relationships is potentially
damaging or embarrassing. 0 Under such circumstances, one can
reasonably conclude that the attorney-client and psychotherapist-
patient relationships would not function effectively without the
guarantee of an evidentiary privilege. 7 In contrast, con-
fidentiality, although certainly desirable, is not really essential to
the parent-child relationship." Realistically, children often are
much more reluctant to discuss private matters with their parents
than with other trusted adults or with friends.73 Children are
seldom completely candid with their parents about their
misdeeds, largely because they view parents as authority figures, a
role that society demands of parents .7 Typically, bonds other than
shared secrets hold a parent-child relationship together.
Proponents of parent-child privilege can point to no evidence that
its general nonrecognition has appreciably affected parent-child
ties.7 5
69. See Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (psychothera-
pist-patient); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 87-88 (lawyer-client); Note, supra note 40,
at 1335.
70. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Lora v. Board of
Educ., 74 F.RD. 565, 571 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (psychotherapist-patient relationship);
M. GuTr A CHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 68, at 272; Louisell, supra note 14, at 745;
Slovenko, supra note 5, at 184-85.
71. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 99, at 213 n.9 (psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291 (attorney-client relationship); Guttmacher &
Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 28 IND. L.J. 32
(1952); Louisell, supra note 14, at 744-45 (psychotherapist-patient relationship'); Sterk,
Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of Law Problems, 61 MINN. L.
REv. 461, 471 (1977) (attorney-client relationship). But see Morgan, Suggested Remedy
for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of Evidence, 10 U. CI. L. REv. 285,
288-90 (1943) (theory that attorney-client privilege is necessary to ensure that attorney gets
all essential information is sheer speculation); Functional Overlap, supra note 4, at 1232;
cf. Black, supra note 16, at 51 (no ground for singling out psychotherapy over other medical
treatment; would extend privilege to all doctors).
72. See A. JERSILD, supra note 33, at 250. But see Alternative Means, supra note 8,
at 236.
73. See A. JERSILD, supra note 33, at 249-50; Rosenheim, supra note 40, at 672.
74. See Loevinger, Patterns of Child Rearing as Theories of Learning, in FAMILY IN
TRANSrnON 345 (A. Skolnick & J. Skolnick eds. 1971) (" ITihe child's impulse gratifica-
tion conflicts with the needs of society, represented by parents, to socialize him .... ");
Shong, The Legal Responsibility of Parents for Their Children's Delinquency, 6 FAM.
L.Q. 145, 156-66 (1972); cf Note, supra note 40, at 1327 (school counselors' ability to
establish confidential relationship is undermined if students view them as a part of
school authority structure).
75. "[O]ne may seriously doubt that the law of evidence had any formative effect on
family life in general." Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 46, at 677.
194 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 3:177
The parent-child privilege clearly satisfies Wigmore's third
requirement since community opinion obviously favors fostering
the parent-child relationship. Community opinion, however,
would not necessarily favor fostering confidentiality in the rela-
tionship by means of an evidentiary privilege.
Deciding whether the parent-child privilege satisfies the
fourth requirement is somewhat conjectural because both injury
and benefit are difficult to quantify,7" but the privilege probably
fails this prong of Wigmore's test. The present injury to the
parent-child relationship from general nonrecognition of the
privilege appears to be insignificant. If recognized, the privilege
would be unlikely to actually encourage parent-child com-
munication because few children would be aware of the rule." All
privileges are inefficient devices to promote the policies they
profess to serve but are extremely effective as obstructions to
accurate adjudication.78 In litigation the truth is seldom manifest,
and the danger of an erroneous verdict increases whenever the
trier of fact must reach a decision with less than all available
relevant evidence. Thus, every privilege impairs the administra-
tion of justice, and this burden is tolerable only when the
corresponding benefit is clear.79 The benefit to be gained from
recognition of a parent-child privilege, however, is uncertain at
best.
Recognition of a parent-child privilege is unwarranted as a
matter of public policy. None of the rationales advanced by pro-
ponents of the privilege are particularly persuasive. The pro-
posed privilege probably satisfies only two of the four require-
ments of Wigmore's test. Merely because the parent-child
relationship shares certain characteristics with other relation-
ships that generally enjoy evidentiary privileges is not a suffi-
cient reason to keep even additional relevant evidence out of
trials.
76. "Ultimately, the evaluation of the social and moral importance . . . of any con-
fidential communication privilege, in relation to the significance at a trial of foreclosing
ascertainment of the full facts, involves value judgments, the testing of which . . . is
presently subject to no scientific technique." Louisell, supra note 14, at 750.
77. See notes 45-46 supra.
78. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 79.
79. "The recognition of a privilege to withhold from a trial evidence having a real
probative value should occur only when the need of the privilege and the purpose served
by it are so great that the truth may be sacrificed with the consequent impairment of the
administration of justice." Ladd, supra note 22, at 557 (footnote omitted). See Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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III. PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
FAMILY AUTONOMY
Currently, only one legislature has accepted the policy argu-
ments of parent-child privilege proponents by enacting a statu-
tory privilege. 0 This fact, coupled with a general recognition by
courts and commentators that policy questions such as the crea-
tion of new privileges are best left to legislatures,8' has forced
parties wishing to block familial testimony to develop alternative
constitutional arguments." The most common of these constitu-
tional arguments is based on the constitutional right of privacy. s3
In In re A & M,11 the New York Appellate Division held that
the federal constitutional right of privacy protects confidential
communications between minor child and parent from com-
pelled disclosure to a grand jury. Seeking testimony concerning
incriminating statements by a sixteen-year-old arson suspect to
his parents, the prosecutor in A & M issued grand jury subpoe-
nas to the suspect's parents. The A & M court recognized a con-
stitutional right of the parents to refuse to testify about admis-
sions made to them by their son in seeking their support, advice,
80. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
81. In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 748, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913, 915 (1976); In re
A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (1978); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2,
§ 77; Slovenko, supra note 5, at 181; Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1011; Alter-
native Means, supra note 8, at 233 n.102; see L6uisell & Crippin, supra note 4, at 436.
82. Parties have raised constitutional arguments in seeking recognition of a parent-
child privilege. See In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976) (self-
incrimination, right to counsel, and right of privacy); In re Mark G., 65 A.D.2d 917, 410
N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978) (right of privacy); In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978)
(right of privacy); People v. Fitzgerald, - Misc. 2d - 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester
County Ct. 1979) (right of privacy); cf. Cissna v. State,___ Ind. App. -_, 252 N.E.2d 793
(1976) ("Natural Law"). Parties also have raised constitutional arguments in support of
other privileges when no statutory privilege was available. See, e.g., Caesar v. Mountanos,
542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (psychotherapist-patient
privilege-right of privacy, equal protection, and due process); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74
F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (psychotherapist-patient privilege-right of privacy); United
States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d
Cir. 1977) (psychotherapist-patient privilege-sixth amendment right to effective
counsel); Felber v. Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85 (D. Conn. 1970) (three-judge court)
(psychotherapist-patient privilege-right of privacy and due process).
83. See In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976); In re Mark
G., 65 A.D.2d 917, 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978); In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1978); People v. Fitzgerald, - Misc. 2d -, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County
Ct. 1979); Black, supra note 16, at 48 (marital privilege); Reutlinger, supra note 4, at
1356 n.9 (marital privilege).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), was the first Supreme Court decision
to recognize a discrete constitutional right of privacy. For contemporaneous assessments
of the significance of Griswold, see Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv.
197 (1965).
84. 61 A.D.2d 426, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1978).
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or guidance. 5 Employing a substantive due process analysis, "
the court concluded that the integrity of family relational inter-
ests is constitutionally protected. 7
Weighing the competing family and state interests, the
85. Id. at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. In a subsequent case, In re Mark G., 65
A.D.2d 917, 410 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1978), the same court denied a claim of privilege when it
determined that the child's admission was not made "for the purpose of obtaining sup-
port, advice or guidance." Id. at 918, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
In In re Terry W., 59 Cal. App. 3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976), a California appel-
late court rejected a similar claim of privilege, although the court dealt with the right of
privacy claim in a rather unsatisfactory manner. See id. at 748-49, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 914-
15.
Although the A & M court limited its holding to "communications made by a minor
child to his parents within the context of the family relationship," 61 A.D.2d at 435, 403
N.Y.S.2d at 381 (emphasis added), a New York trial court, relying on A & M, recently
ruled that admissions a 23-year-old negligent homicide defendant made to his father were
privileged, even though the defendant was no longer living with his parents when the
conversation occurred. People v. Fitzgerald, - Misc. 2d -, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westches-
ter County Ct. 1979).
86. Substantive due process refers to the judicial practice of constitutionalizing
values that cannot be inferred easily from the constitutional text, the structure of
government established by the Constitution, or historical materials clarifying otherwise
vague constitutional provisions. Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the
Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 43, 83-84; Perry, Substantive Due
Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417, 419
(1976). See generally E. CORWIN, LIaRTY AGAINST GovERNMENT (1948); G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 616-56 (9th ed. 1975); see also McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup.
CT. REV. 34.
87. 61 A.D.2d at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The court cited Note, The Fundamen-
tal Right to Family Integrity and Its Role in New York Foster Care Adjudications. 44
BROOKLYN L. REV. 63 (1977), for the historical development of the legal principles sup-
porting family integrity. That note, however, is concerned exclusively with child custody.
Indeed, the author of the note nowhere addresses the confidentiality of parent-child com-
munications, apparently not considering it a significant aspect of family integrity. The
note describes family integrity as "the parents' rights to the physical custody of and
decision-making concerning their children, the mutual rights of parents and children to
one another's care and companionship and to a continuing family heritage, and various
secondary, inchoate rights ... when the family members are separated from one
another." Id. at 63.
If this is all that is meant by family integrity, few would quarrel with its legal
protection.
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[ilf a
State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objec-
tions of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and
for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best
interest."
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769
(M.D. Ala. 1976) (three-judge court); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.
Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
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A & M court apparently used the Supreme Court's method of
adjudication in Roe v. Wade. 88 In Roe, the Court initiated the use
of the "compelling state interest" test in substantive due process
cases.89 The first step in this analysis is to determine whether the
asserted individual interest constitutes a fundamental right: one
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'0 or "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.""1 Although the A & M court
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Conflicting language in A & M creates uncertainty over whether the court merely
balanced the competing interests or instead subjected the state action to strict scrutiny.
The two methods of adjudication are somewhat different. See United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967). For a succinct discussion of the dangers of balancing as a
method of constitutional adjudication, see Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitu-
tional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. Rev. 1022, 1047-48 (1978). This comment will assume that
the court applied strict scrutiny, the method more highly protective of the family interest
asserted in the case.
For commentary on Roe, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name:
The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159; Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the
Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973); O'Meara, Abortion: The
Court Decides a Non-Case, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 337; Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals,
and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L.
REv. 689 (1976); Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALe L.J. 221 (1973).
89. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), four members of the Court, in
concurring opinions, used the compelling state interest test, id. at 496-98 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring); id. at 503-07 (White, J., concurring), but not until Roe was it clear that a
majority of the Court would adopt this method of adjudication in right of privacy cases.
Justice Rehnquist recognized the significance of this aspect of the Roe opinion:
[Tihe Court adds a new wrinkle to [the compelling state interest] test by
transposing it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause .... Unless I misapprehend the consequences of this transplanting
of the [test], the Court's opinion will accomplish the seemingly impossible feat
of leaving this area of the law more confused than it found it.
410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have
a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1166-67 (1974); Comment, Roe v. Wade and Doe
v. Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 628 (1973).
90. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
91. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). This
test derives from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), in which the Court
spoke of rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." The Snyder test has appeared in previous privacy cases. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Court has
employed other similar tests of fundamentality as well. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
149 (1968) ("fundamental to the American scheme of justice"); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 67 (1932) ("fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions"). Some commentators have questioned the usefulness of
such tests. See, e.g., McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-
Making, 39 MINN. L. REv. 837, 850 (1955) ("Concepts such as these are so vaguely and
loosely worded as to allow almost any content to be poured into them.").
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concluded that the family interest warranted classification as a
fundamental right, 2 close analysis of Supreme Court precedents
indicates that the court's conolusion was probably erroneous. 3
Under the second part of the test, if the individual interest
qualifies as fundamental, the state must demonstrate that any
infringement of the interest is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest. The A & M court concluded that the state inter-
est in accurate adjudication in insufficient to overcome "the
interest of society in protecting and nurturing the parent-child
relationship,"15 although that conclusion was unwarranted in light
of recent Supreme Court decisions."
In effect creating a new constitutional privilege analogous to
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, 7 the
In Griswold, Justice Douglas used a somewhat different approach, discovering the
fundamental right of privacy in the "penumbras" of specific Bill of Rights guarantees.
381 U.S. at 484-85. Lately, however, the Court has avoided using the penumbral analysis,
see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153, which in
practice imposes no greater checks on judicial discretion than other tests of fundamen-
tality, see Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L.
REV. 979, 993.
92. 61 A.D.2d at 431-32, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79.
93. See text accompanying notes 99-146 infra; Krattenmaker, supra note 13, at 97
n.134.
Moreover, some commentators question the utility of a fundamental rights analysis
when dealing with "privacy" rights. See Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests as a
Method of Constitutional Adjudication, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 823, 845 (1977) (Court's
explanations of fundamentality either conclusory or unacceptably vague); Goodpaster,
The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 Ajuz. L. REv. 479, 482-83 (1973) (limiting
fundamental rights to first amendment rights, political participation rights, and rights to
procedural due process and equal protection); Wellington, supra note 88, at 299 (asserts
that it is misleading to describe interest in abortion as fundamental).
94. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 163-64.
95. 61 A.D.2d at 434, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
96. See notes 147-59 infra and accompanying text. Furthermore, by approving and
sending to Congress the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973), which
did not contain a parent-child privilege, the Court probably prejudged the constitution-
ality of not recognizing the privilege. See United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425
F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977); Krattenmaker,
supra note 13, at 94-96.
97. The fifth amendment privilege is the only evidentiary privilege explicitly recog-
nized in the Constitution. Some form of executive privilege, however, is implicit in the
article II powers of the President. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-07, 715
(1974). In addition, the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
arguably demands recognition of an attorney-client privilege for criminal defendants. See
Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1978); Note, supra note 18, at 485-86;
Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8, at 679. But see Maness v. Meyers, 419
U.S. 449, 466 n.15 (1975); Magida ex rel Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can Co.,
12 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The free exercise clause of the first amendment arguably
demands recognition of a priest-penitent privilege. Silver, The Future of Constitutional
Privacy, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 211, 277 (1977); Slovenko, Constitutional Limitations on the
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A & M court extended the constitutional right of privacy far
beyond the boundaries previously marked by the Supreme
Court." The court's treatment of Supreme Court precedents was
marked by careless scholarship, selective quoting of dicta, disre-
gard for case holdings, and semantic sleight of hand. The princi-
pal cases cited by the court do not support a right of family pri-
vacy of the sort identified in A & M.
Meyer v. Nebraska99 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 100 both
frequently cited as authority by the Supreme Court in recent pri-
vacy cases,' °0 illustrate that there are constitutional limits to
state interference with certain parental child-rearing decisions. In
Meyer, the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the teaching
of modern foreign languages earlier than the eighth grade; in
Pierce, the Court invalidated a statute requiring parents to send
their children to public schools. According to the A & M court,
Meyer and Pierce "were based on the principle that 'the parental
Rules of Evidence, 26 U. CINN. L. REv. 493, 495 (1957); see Stoyles, The Dilemma of the
Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege-The Application of the Religion
Clauses, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 27 (1967). Any other constitutional privilege would have to
be derived from broadly worded provisions of the Constitution such as the ninth or four-
teenth amendments.
The court insisted that it was not creating a privilege despite recognizing certain
communications between parent and child as protected by the constitutional right of
family privacy. 61 A.D.2d at 434-35, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381. Even commentators who look
with favor upon the decision, however, conclude that the court did in effect create a
narrow privilege. See Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 799.
98. Justice Stewart and several lower federal courts have noted that there is no"general constitutional right of privacy." E.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607-08
(1977) (concurring opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 168 n.2 (concurring opinion); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (opinion of the Court); United States v.Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 173-74 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Fraser v.
United States, 452 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1971); Alma Soc. Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp.912, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F.
Supp. 202, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp.321, 357 n.51 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge court), aff'd, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Felber v.
Foote, 321 F. Supp. 85, 88 (D. Conn. 1970) (three-judge court).
A broad constitutional right of privacy raises serious questions about the judicial
practice of striking down democratically enacted laws. See Moore v. City of E. Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion); Dixon, supra note 86, at 44-45. See
generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1958). Furthermore, a broad but vague constitutional right might less effectively protect
privacy than would a narrow but more clearly defined right. Ely, Constitutional Interpre-
tivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 402-03 (1978); Note, supra note 89,
at 1173-74.
99. 262 U.S..390 (1923).
100. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
101. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1977).
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right to guide one's child intellectually and religiously is a most
substantial part of the liberty and freedom of the parent.' 
"102
For several reasons, however, Meyer and Pierce are ques-
tionable authority for strict scrutiny of the state action in
A & M. Both cases are products of the now discredited era of
economic substantive due process. 10 3 In Meyer, although the
holding was predicated in part on parental rights, the Court
framed the issue as whether the challenged statute unreasonably
infringed the liberty the fourteenth amendment guaranteed to
the appellant teacher to pursue his chosen occupation.
104 Simi-
larly, in Pierce, the appellee private schools sought and received
protection from interference with their patrons and the con-
sequent destruction of their business and property.
10 5 In neither
case were parents parties to the legal action. When the Court
abandoned any serious review of social and economic legisla-
tion,106 cases like Meyer and Pierce also had to be abandoned
unless they could be justified on some other basis.'
07 The Court has
failed to enunciate a consistent theory of why Meyer and Pierce
are still good law.1'01 Furthermore, although the A & M court
102. 61 A.D.2d at 430, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378. The A & M opinion creates the impres-
sion that this language comes from the Court's opinion in Pierce when, in fact, it comes
from the brief for appellee Society of Sisters. See 269 U.S. at 518.
103. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 514-16 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
Ely, supra note 88, at 931 n.79, 937-43. But see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 1108, 1167 (1972). For general background on economic due process, see Strong, 
The
Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 
15 ARIZ. L.
REv. 419 (1973).
104. 262 U.S. at 399.
105. 268 U.S. at 536.
106. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934). See generally Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, 
in AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HISTORICAL ESSAYS 131 (L. Levy ed. 1966); Hetherington, 
State
Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law (pts. 1-2), 53 Nw. U.L. REV.
13, 226 (1958); Rodes, Due Process and Social Legislation in the Supreme Court-A Post-
mortem, 33 NoTRE DAM~rE LAw. 5 (1957).
107. Wellington, supra note 88, at 278.
107.1. Meyer and Pierce were first reinterpreted as cases involving "statutes directed
at particular religious . . . or national .. . minorities." United States v. Carolene 
Prod-
ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted). Indeed, the cases have aspects
supporting this "discrete and insular minorities" interpretation of the holdings. 
See
Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1306 n.42 (1976); Alternative Means, supra
note 8, at 227 n.41; cf. Perry, supra note 86, at 431 n.89 (citing Meyer and Pierce 
as
examples of the "seemingly inherent tendency of the state to impose 
cultural
conformity").
More recently, at least prior to Roe, the Court has tended to treat Meyer and Pierce
as essentially first amendment cases. Tribe, supra note 88, at 8 n.39; see Wisconsin 
v.
Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 213-14, 233 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1968);'
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purported to balance two legitimate but competing interests,10
the Court in Meyer and Pierce concluded that the statutes in
question were arbitrary and not reasonably related to a legiti-
mate state purpose.'"9 The A & M court conceded that the state
has a "legitimate interest in the process of fact-finding neces-
sary to discover, try and punish criminal behavior"" 0 and could
not characterize the state action as arbitrary or unrelated to
that interest. Thus, Meyer and Pierce cannot satisfactorily sup-
port the result in A & M.
The A & M court selectively quoted dicta from another
Supreme Court opinion as support for a family privacy right but
ignored more authoritative language in the same opinion limit-
ing that right. In Prince v. Massachusetts,"' the Court upheld
criminal laws forbidding parents or guardians to permit their
children to sell merchandise in public places and forbidding any-
one to furnish such merchandise to children. The A & M court
quoted language in Prince declaring that "the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents" and acknowledg-
ing "a private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."112 In the next two sentences of the opinion, however, the
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (Douglas, J.); id. at 516 (Black, J.,
dissenting); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543-44 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Garvey,
Child, Parent, State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's
Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 806 (1978). Justice Powell's statement that Meyer
and Pierce have survived because they built on the traditions of this country, Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 n.8 (1977) (plurality opinion), is consistent with
this view of those cases. First amendment freedoms are among the most basic of our
traditions.
The first amendment values protected in Meyer and Pierce, free exercise of religion
and access to ideas protected by the free speech clause, are noticeably absent in A & M.
Professor Tribe argues, however, that the first amendment right of association extends
protection to the family. Tribe, supra note 88, at 34-38. But see Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 534-36 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 604 n.32 (1977) (both opinions rejecting right of association argument because
claimed invocation not for the purpose of advancing ideas or airing grievances).
In the most recent opinions, the Court has treated Meyer and Pierce as "family pri-
vacy" cases, due in part no doubt to the renewed respectability of substantive due
process.
108. 61 A.D.2d at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. The court cited Roe v. Wade as an
example of a case in which the Supreme Court had balanced two competing legitimate
interests. Id. But see Perry, supra note 86, at 421 (arguing that the Roe Court did not
really balance two competing legitimate interests, but rather concluded that the objec-
tive of the Texas abortion statute was illegitimate according to conventional morality).
109. 268 U.S. at 535-36; 262 U.S. at 403.
110. 61 A.D.2d at 433, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
111. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
112. 61 A.D.2d at 430, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (quoting 321 U.S. at 166).
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Prince Court stated that "the family itself is not beyond regula-
tion in the public interest" and "rights of parenthood are [not]
beyond limitation."11 3 These latter passages much more accu-
rately reflect the Prince Court's holding that the state could
enforce its statutes against the guardian of a child distributing
religious literature.
Without citing Prince or any other authority, the A & M
court conceded later in its opinion that the state may regulate
the family but insisted that when the state does so, its interests
must be carefully examined "to insure that there exists a legiti-
mate purpose in abridging this familial interest.""' The court,
however, seemingly proceeded to ignore its own statement of the
applicable test when it acknowledged a legitimate state purpose
but nevertheless invalidated the state action."5
The A & M court also cited Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER)"' for language
acknowledging the importance of emotional attachments in the
family and of the socializing function of the family," 7 but the
court apparently ignored the holding in that case. In OFFER,
the Supreme Court held that New York's informal procedures for
removing children from foster homes provided sufficient due pro-
cess protection to any possible fourteenth amendment liberty
interests involved. OFFER was decided not on substantive, but
rather on procedural due process grounds;" 8 the close emotional
ties potentially present in a foster family formed the only pos-
sible basis for recognition of even this limited protection."'
113. 321 U.S. at 166. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Sims v. Wain, 536 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1976); Baker v.
Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975);
Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va. 1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 986-87 (1978); Gerety, Redefinink'Privacy, 12 H~av. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 233, 273 n.144 (19771.
114. 61 A.D.2d at 430, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
115. Id. at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
116. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
117. " 'The importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association, and from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life" through the
instruction of children.' " 61 A.D.2d at 430, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (quoting 431 U.S. at 844
(citation omitted)).
118. A substantive due process issue was not raised in OFFER. The foster parents
argued not that the state was without authority to remove the children, but rather that
a prior hearing satisfying due process was a necessary requirement. 431 U.S. at 820. See
generally P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 679-93 (1975).
119. 431 U.S. at 839. A majority of the Court was willing to assume, without decid-
ing, that the foster family was entitled to procedural due process protection because the
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Consequently, OFFER does not support a substantive due process
challenge to any state action with a potential adverse impact on
the parent-child relationship.120
Finally, the A & M court cited as authority Justice Powell's
plurality opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 2, but Pow-
ell's approach in Moore indicates that A & M was probably
wrongly decided. The Moore plurality concluded that a zoning
ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling unit essentially to
members of a nuclear family violated the substantive protections
of the due process clause. 22 Justice Powell sought appropriate
limits on substantive due process in history and tradition.'2I He
concluded that the state cannot deny an extended family the
right to live together because the extended family has venerable
roots in our history. 2 4 The parent-child privilege can hardly be
described as "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,' ' 25 however, because prior to 1972 no American court or leg-
intimacy of its daily interaction constituted a "liberty" interest. Id. at 847. Justice
Stewart could not accept this approach: "Rather than tiptoeing around this central issue, I
would squarely hold that the interests asserted by the [foster parents] are not of a kind
that the Due Process Clause . . .protects." Id. at 857-58 (Stewart, J., concurring). In
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.
1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978), the Fifth Circuit addressed the question
the OFFER majority avoided, holding that "there is no liberty interest ... of full-fledged
constitutional magnitude" in the foster family. Id. at 1209.
120. In fact, the Court explicitly cautioned against reading OFFER too broadly: "Of
course, recognition of a liberty interest in foster families for purposes of the procedural
protections of the Due Process Clause would not necessarily require that foster families
be treated as fully equivalent to biological families for purposes of substantive due pro-
cess review." 431 U.S. at 842 n.48. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
545-47 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
121. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). Moore was a 4-1-4 decision, Justice
Stevens agreeing with the plurality's result, although not joining in Justice Powell's
opinion.
122. Id. at 506.
123. Id. at 503-05. "[An approach grounded in history imposes limits on the judi-
ciary that are more meaningful than any based on the abstract formula taken from Palko
v. Connecticut . . .and apparently suggested as an alternative." Id. at 503 n.12 (cita-
tions omitted). See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring);
notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
Some would question whether searching for fundamental values in tradition actually
serves to check judicial discretion in any meaningful sense. Moore, 431 U.S. at 549-50
(White, J., dissenting); Ely, Forward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HApRv. L.
REV. 1, 39-43 (1978).
124. 431 U.S. at 504-05.
125. Id. at 503. Defenders of the A & M decision might respond that although tradi-
tion does not support a parent-child privilege, our society has traditionally fostered the
parent-child relationship. Indeed, Moore and several previous decisions of the Court con-
tain broad rhetoric of this sort. See id. at 503 n.12. By characterizing a particular interest
in sufficiently general terms, however, one can find a general American tradition to sup-
port virtually any interest. See Ely, supra note 123, at 39 n.148, 40-41 & n.156.
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islature ever had recognized a parent-child privilege.'26 According
to the Moore plurality, the liberty protected by the due process
clause includes "freedom from all substantial arbitrary imposi-
tions and purposeless restraints" and assures that fundamental
interests receive "particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgement.' 27 The plurality concluded
that only a tenuous relation existed between the challenged ordi-
nance and the goals advanced to justify its enactment. 2 Clearly,
this is not a reasonable description of the state action challenged
in A & M. Furthermore, although the A & M opinion obviously
is modeled closely on the Moore plurality opinion, 2 9 the Moore
opinion gives no indication that the family interest in A '& M
deserves substantive due process protection. Although it con-
tains broad language reaffirming earlier family cases such as
Meyer and Pierce, the Moore opinion merely concludes that
when the state intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, substantive due process review is appropriate.' 0
The Moore opinion, therefore, does not suggest that every state
action affecting family interests will call for strict scrutiny of the
state's justifications.
A more general examination of previous right of privacy
cases underscores the conclusion that A & M was wrongly
decided. By speaking in broad terms of a monolithic right of
The Moore plurality was not content to show only a general tradition favoring the
family, but rather focused more narrowly on the "tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children." 431 U.S.
at 504. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd
mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (discussing Meyer, Pierce, and Prince).
126. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. "If a thing has been practised for
two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the 14th Amend-
ment to affect it ...." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
The liberty protected by the due process clause denotes rights "long recognized at com-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399. See Antieau, supra note 93, at 850-51, 854, 876.
127. 431 U.S. at 502 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
128. Id. at 500. Indeed, Justice Stevens voted to invalidate the ordinance under the
limited standard of City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), because it
had not "been shown to have any 'substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare.' " 431 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Euclid,
272 U.S. at 395). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, noted that "the zoning
power is not a license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions
which cut deeply into private areas of protected family life." Id. at 507 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
129. Compare 61 A.D.2d at 429-30, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 378 with 431 U.S. at 499.
130. 431 U.S. at 499.
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family privacy or family integrity, the A & M court created an
illusion of precedent when none existed. Although right of pri-
vacy claims have proliferated in recent years,' 3 ' analytically the
concept of privacy is still rather amorphous.' :2 In Whalen v.
Roe, '3 however, the Supreme Court recognized at least two dis-
tinct meanings of privacy as the term had been used in previous
cases: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" (selective disclosure) and "the interest in independence
1
131. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (political
advertising on city buses); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (ordinance
restricting number of unrelated individuals living in one house); Williams v. Kleppe, 539
F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1976) (nude bathing on a public beach); Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975) (sodomy in car parked on public highway);
Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
833 (1975) (spouses' right to work at same school); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973) (possession of two tons of marijuana with
intent to distribute); Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (disclosure of
drug informant's identity); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821
(S.D.W. Va. 1977) (employer seeking to block access to employee medical records by
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health); Plante v. Gonzalez, 437 F. Supp.
536 (N.D. Fla. 1977), affd, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129
(1979) (financial disclosure requirements for state officials); Brown v. Haner, 410 F.Supp. 399 (W.D. Va. 1976) (massage parlor); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
(homosexual acts); Morgan v. City of Detroit, 389 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (solicit-
ing for prostitution); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977) (fornication);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (withdrawal
of life-sustaining medical treatment); Arthur v. Washington State Dep't of Soc. &
Health Servs., 19 Wash. App. 542, 576 P.2d 921 (1978) (aid to dependent children termi-
nated upon refusal to furnish social security numbers); State v. Anderson, 16 Wash. App.
553, 558 P.2d 307 (1976) (private possession and use of marijuana).
132. "[OInly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. [It is
also] clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, . . . pro-
creation, . . . contraception, . . . family relationships, . . . and child rearing and educa-
tion ...... Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Reflecting on the Court's work in this area, Professor Henkin concluded that "we will
know which rights are and which are not within the zone [of privacyl only case by case,
with lines drawn and redrawn, in response to individual and societal initiatives and
imaginativeness of lawyers." Henkin, supra note 18, at 1425-26. See Note, Due Process
Privacy and the Path of Progress, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 469, 501. The Court has offered only
undifferentiated string cites or equally unhelpful explanations such as that in Roe to
indicate what makes the right of privacy a unit. Ely, supra note 123, at 11 n.40. Several
lower courts have expressed uncertainty over the scope of the right of privacy. See, e.g.,
McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1379 (D.N.J. 1978); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74
F.R.D. 565, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Indeed, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), referred to the right of privacy cases as "defying cate-
gorical description." More than one commentator has suggested that the Court's obfusca-
tion in this area may be intentional, to hide what is really going on. See Gross, The
Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 34, 42 (1967); Perry, supra note 86, at 441.
133. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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in making certain kinds of important decisions" (autonomy).',"
The distinction between selective disclosure and autonomy is
crucial because the different meanings of privacy call for quite
different judicial responses. ' 5 Because the parents in A & M
sought to prevent the state from gaining access to personal and
damaging information, their asserted privacy interest was princi-
pally one of selective disclosure.' The Supreme Court decisions
the A & M court relied upon, however, all were based on the
interest in autonomy.'37 The issue in each of those cases was
134. Id. at 598-600. The Court characterized two previous Court opinions, Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), as con-
cerned with selective disclosure. As Justice Stewart noted, however, Stanley's holding
was based on the first amendment, and "[wihatever the ratio decidendi of Griswold, it
does not recognize a general interest in freedom from disclosure of private information."
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Griswold clearly was not a selective disclosure case, even though Justice Douglas
spoke rhetorically of police searching marital bedrooms. The issue in Griswold was
whether the state could bar the use of contraceptives. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 18, at
1424; Krattenmaker, supra note 13, at 95. Thus, no Court opinion has recognized an
interest in selective disclosure protected by the constitutional right of privacy, as distinct
from the protection of privacy by the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. See
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
The third amendment was obviously inapplicable in A & M, and recent Supreme
Court decisions would preclude fourth or fifth amendment protection under the circum-
stances of that case. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1976). The
first amendment right of association, although an arguable ground for protection, proba-
bly also would fail. See note 107 supra.
.For a well-reasoned district court opinion attempting to clarify this difficult area of
constitutional law, see Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 207-10 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
135. Note, supra note 89, at 1163. "Great care is necessary in determining which
zone [of privacy] is at issue in any given case, since the mode of analysis, type of proof,
standards, and source of protection vary between the zones." Comment, A Taxonomy of
Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1482 (1976).
See Henkin, supra note 18, at 1425; Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1015 & n.93. But
see Confidential Communication, supra note 8, at 824-26.
136. An argument could be made that the parents have an autonomy interest in
deciding how their child should be punished for antisocial acts. The state must take
action to protect the public, however, when serious delinquent acts are committed. The
dispositional decision in such cases is not one that can conveniently be left to parents
because of the presumed bias generated by family ties and parental concern with their
own child's best interests. Garvey, supra note 107, at 805. See Sims v. Wain, 536 F.2d 686
(6th Cir. 1976); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd
mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (both cases holding corporal punishment in schools not forbid-
den merely because it interferes with right of parental control).
137.
The right of privacy that emerges from Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe is a
right to engage in conduct or undergo experiences without governmental inter-
ference, when the conduct or experiences do not implicate the public morals or
any other aspect of the public welfare. This right of privacy, privacy-as-auton-
omy if you will, is distinct from that other right of privacy whose referents are
secrecy and seclusion.
Perry, supra note 86, at 440. See Dixon, supra note 86, at 84; Krattenmaker, supra note
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whether the individual or the state should make fundamental
decisions that shape family life: whom to marry or live with,: '
whether or when to have children,"' or with what values to raise
those children.14 0 The issue was not whether information about
family members may be withheld from the state.
The A & M court's use of strict scrutiny also is questionable
in light of the Supreme Court's distinction between direct and
incidental interference with interests protected by the Constitu-
tion. The Court has strongly suggested that only direct and sub-
stantial interference with protected interests will subject state
action to rigorous scrutiny.'' Branz burg v. Hayes,' another case
13, at 96 (the Roe Court used privacy in a sense other than that which would necessarily
imply a constitutionally compelled marital privilege); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and
the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten
Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 973 n.73, 1017 (1979); Silver, supra note 97, at 254-
55. But see Tribe, supra note 88, at 17 n.83.
138. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Fami-
lies, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
139. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961).
140. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see L. TRIBE, supra note 113, at
987; Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 88, at 772.
141. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978); id. at 391 (Burger, C.J., con-
curring); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 703-04 (1977) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 78 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-83, 693-95 (1972); see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S.
47 (1977). Other authority indicates that the extent to which the individual interest is
affected should be one factor considered, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 396 (Stew-
art, J., concurring); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 603; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), or draws a distinction between direct state interfer-
ence with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity, Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 94-95 (1976).
The distinction between direct interference and incidental burdening may have
developed in response to what one commentator calls the "canonization problem" inher-
ent in a double standard of judicial review. See Goodpaster, supra note 93, at 505.
Declaring a right to be fundamental appears to give the right a nearly inviolable sanctity,
for state authority cannot regulate or burden its exercise without showing a compelling
need to do so. The interests subsumable under any given right, however, may range from
the trivial to the extremely important. If the right is declared fundamental, the state
may be precluded from regulating even the trivial instances of its exercise. On the other
hand, strained analysis may be required to show that the claimed right is not really in
issue, or that the state actually has a compelling interest, or that the exercise of the right
is not really burdened in the particular case. Id.
Whether the distinction between direct and indirect interference provides a princi-
pled means of deciding cases is questionable. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 396-97
(Powell, J., concurring). The Court earlier found a similar direct-indirect distinction
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involving an alleged constitutional privilege, illustrates this prin-
ciple well. The issue in Branzburg was whether the first amend-
ment exempts journalists from divulging to a grand jury the con-
fidential sources of news stories about criminal activities. In the
Court's view, the challenged state action was not a direct
restraint on press freedom but rather a law of general application
that might incidentally burden the press.'4 3 The Branzburg
Court acknowledged the rationality of the argument that the
flow of news would be diminished by compelling reporters to aid
grand juries in criminal investigations and noted evidence in the
record supporting that argument.'44 The Court found the argu-
ment speculative and unpersuasive, however, and accordingly
concluded that the case did not present a substantial first
amendment question.'
The Branzburg Court's reasoning is equally applicable to
the facts in A & M. The state in A & M did not attempt to
forbid or restrict confidential parent-child communications, nor
did it indiscriminately require parents to disclose them. The sole
issue in A .& M was whether parents of a criminal suspect must
respond to subpoenas as other citizens do and answer questions
relevant to a criminal investigation. No convincing evidence
exists that nonrecognition of a parent-child privilege signifi-
cantly discourages parent-child communications. "'
Even if the state action in A & M directly interfered with a
fundamental right, Branzburg and another recent evidentiary
privilege decision, United States v. Nixon,'47 indicate that the
state still satisfied the compelling state interest test. The
Supreme Court's evaluation of competing interests in Branzburg
unworkable in commerce clause cases. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
142. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). For a detailed commentary critical of the Branzburg deci-
sion, see Murasky, supra note 4.
143. 408 U.S. at 681-83, 691. Some commentators, however, believe the press
deserves far more protection than the Branzburg Court was willing to grant it. See, e.g.,
Murasky, supra note 4.
144. 408 U.S. at 693. Evidence supporting this view can be found in V. BLASI, PRESS
SUBPOENAS: AN EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 20-29 (1970); Blasi, The Newsmans Privi-
lege: An Empirical Study, 71 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1971); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitu-
tional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969).
145. 408 U.S. at 693-97.
146. See notes 32-48 supra and accompanying text. "Empirical proof of the precise
nature and extent of the impact testimonial privileges have on individual privacy proba-
bly does not exist." Krattenmaker, supra note 13, at 97. But see Mouths of Babes, supra
note 8, at 1018-20 (rejecting comparison between newsman-source and parent-child
privileges).
147. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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and Nixon clearly indicates that the Constitution does not man-
date a parent-child privilege.
The Branzburg Court stressed the importance of the testi-
monial duty in a manner that reveals a decided hostility to all
privileges. "' Rejecting the claim of a qualified journalist's privi-
lege, "I the Court held that the public interest in law enforcement
is sufficiently important to override the interest in news gather-
ing.50 The Court also stated that "[c]itizens generally are not
constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas, and neither
the First Amendment nor any other constitutional provision pro-
tects the average citizen from disclosing to a grand jury informa-
tion that he has received in confidence.''"- Although technically
dictum, this passage certainly suggests a reluctance to recognize
any constitutionally-based evidentiary privilege other than the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In addi-
tion, the Court rejected the journalists' argument that the
infringement of their first amendment interest was broader than
necessary to achieve the state's purpose, stating that the investi-
gative power of the grand jury must necessarily be broad if it is
to fulfill adequately its public responsibility.'52 Because constitu-
tional authority underlying the parent-child privilege is doubtful
at best, 53 in contrast to the explicit constitutional protection
accorded the press, 15 surely the Constitution does not provide
148.
It is apparent . . that concealment of crime and agreements to do so are not
looked upon with favor. Such conduct deserves no encomium, and we
decline now to afford it First Amendment protection by denigrating the duty of
a citizen . . . to respond to grand jury subpoena and answer relevant questions
put to him.
408 U.S. at 697. See Krattenmaker, supra note 13, at 97.
149. In Branzburg, the journalists argued that the state could obtain information
from them only by first demonstrating that: (1) probable cause existed to believe that they
had information relevant to a grand jury's investigation; (2) the information could not be
obtained from alternative sources; and (3) the grand jury had a compelling need for the
information. 408 U.S. at 680.
150. Id. at 690-91.
151. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 688.
153. The constitutional authority for the parent-child privilege in fact is nonexistent,
as indicated by this comment's treatment of the constitutional right of family autonomy.
See notes 99-146 supra and accompanying text.
154. "Congress shall make no law . ..abridging the freedom .. .of the press .
U.S. CONST. amend. I. First amendment values "hold a preferred position in the hierar-
chy of the constitutional guarantees of the incidents of freedom." Poulos v. New Hamp-
shire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 (1953). See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115
(1943); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937); McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34
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parents a special testimonial status denied to journalists.'5
The Court in Nixon further indicated that the state's inter-
est in the production of evidence would be regarded as "compel-
ling" in the context of A & M. In Nixon, the President asserted a
claim of absolute executive privilege when he was subpoenaed to
produce tape recordings and documents relating to his conversa-
tions with aides and advisors. Although acknowledging that a
President has far greater claim to the confidentiality of his con-
versations and correspondence than has an ordinary citizen,'
56
the Court rejected the claim of absolute privilege.'57 The Court
reasoned that presidential advisors' candor would not be inhib-
ited by the possibility that their remarks might be called for in a
criminal prosecution.' 58 On the other hand, the Court concluded
that withholding evidence relevant in a criminal trial would
gravely impair the basic function of the courts.'59
The Constitution does not mandate recognition of a parent-
child privilege. The right of privacy line of cases gives no indica-
tion that the interest in confidential communications between
parent and child qualifies as a fundamental right for the purpose
of substantive due process analysis. Any infringement of this
interest caused by nonrecognition of a parent-child privilege is
indirect and incidental. At any rate, the fundamental state
interest in the integrity of the fact-finding process is sufficiently
compelling to override the interest in the privacy of parent-child
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182 (1959).
155. The Court recently rejected a claim of first amendment privilege involving edi-
torial processes. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
The A & M court rather lamely attempted to distinguish Branzburg: "The nature of
the right asserted here by the parents would not suffer an 'incidental burden' [quoting
Branzburg at 682]. Rather, the parents' relationship with their son would, in all likeli-
hood, be destroyed by compelled disclosure." 61 A.D.2d at 434 n.7, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380
n.7. One commentator believes that the marital and doctor-patient privileges have the
strongest claims to constitutional protection under the right of privacy. He also believes,
however, that such claims are effectively foreclosed by Branzburg. See Krattenmaker,
supra note 13, at 95-96.
156. 418 U.S. at 708.
157. Id. at 706-07. The Court held that presidential communications are "presump-
tively privileged." If the prosecutor or defendant can demonstrate that the presumptively
privileged materials are essential to the just resolution of a criminal case, however, the
President must surrender the materials for in camera inspection by the judge. The judge
would then excise any materials that are irrelevant, inadmissible, or that would threaten
national security.




communications.I0  Important public policies support most
widely recognized evidentiary privileges, yet very few of these
privileges have a basis in the Constitution. Although the
Supreme Court has recognized "a private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter,"'' this realm does not extend so
far as to encompass a privilege that is unwarranted as a matter
of public policy.' 2
IV. PRESENT AND PROPOSED FORMS OF THE PARENT-CHILD
PRIVILEGE
Even if recognition of a parent-child privilege could be justi-
fied on policy or constitutional grounds, devising an acceptable
form of the privilege is virtually impossible. Control over
whether the privilege is to be invoked must be given either to the
child,6 3 the parent,"' or the court.' None of these choices, how-
160. Alternative Means, supra note 8, at 231-32; see Henkin, supra note 18, at 1429-
30; cf. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
954 (1977) (psychotherapist-patient privilege). But see Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at
1022; Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 801-.02 (state interest not overriding, but
acknowledging that the A & M court's analysis of the competing interests was "somewhat
cursory").
161. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166.
162. Cf. United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), afl'd, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977) (doctor-patient privilege) ("It is implausible that
a privilege that has almost uniformly been found to be practically undesirable and bur-
densome should nonetheless be constitutionally compelled.").
163. A New York county court recently recognized a constitutionally-based parent-
child privilege for confidential communications. People v. Fitzgerald, - Misc. 2d -, 422
N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979). The court, relying on and probably mis-
reading A & M, see note 164 infra, required both parent and child to consent to divul-
gence of confidential communications between them. Compare - Misc. 2d at -, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 315-16 with 61 A.D.2d at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9. Thus, the court
gave effective control of the privilege to the child. Most notably, the court refused to set
any age limit on the privilege. - Misc. 2d at -, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14.
A commentator has proposed a statutory privilege, apparently controlled by the
child, extending to "[any juvenile who is a party to a confidential communication with a
member of his family." Coburn, supra note 8, at 632. The proposal defines "family mem-
bers" covered by the privilege as: (1) parents, or those stepparents living in the same
household as the child; and (2) siblings, including stepbrothers and stepsisters living in
the same household as the child. Id. at 633. Coburn's inclusion of a sibling privilege is
questionable because he underscores the unique nature of the parent-child relationship in
his defense of the proposed statute. See id. at 616-21.
164. Idaho's statutory privilege provides that parents "shall not be forced to disclose
any communication made by this minor child ...to them concerning matter[s] in any
civil or criminal action" to which the child is a party. IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (1979).
The privilege apparently belongs only to the witness parents; therefore, they presumably
could waive the privilege without their child's consent. No reported case, however, has
yet interpreted Idaho's parent-child privilege.
The New York Appellate Division's constitutional privilege requires a confidential
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ever, yields satisfactory results, thus reinforcing the conclusion
communication made by a minor child to his parent for the purpose of obtaining support,
advice, or guidance. In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d at 433-34, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 380. Despite
problems of proving subjective intent, the privilege at first glance appears to be consistent
with its underlying rationale of allowing the child to explore problems in an atmosphere of
trust and understanding without fear that confidences will later be revealed. Id. at 432, 403
N.Y.S.2d at 380. As a condition to recognition, however, the court required that both parent
and child invoke the privilege because children might abuse a privilege that they could
invoke unilaterally. Id. at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9.
One student commentator has proposed a statutory privilege similar to the foregoing
constitutional privilege. The proposed statute would protect a minor child's confidential
communications, either by words or communicative acts, in all proceedings where testi-
mony under oath is required. Like the A & M constitutional privilege, either child or
parent could waive the privilege. The presence at the time of the communication of other
family members, such as siblings, would not nullify the privilege but they could be forced
to testify. Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 807-09.
A second student commentator has proposed a similar statutory privilege. Differing
only slightly from the foregoing proposed statute, the privilege would apply only to chil-
dren of an age subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Furthermore, the presence
of third parties at the time of the communication would preclude a claim of privilege.
Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8, at 689-90.
A third student commentator, although failing to draft a concrete statutory proposal,
also has suggested a privilege that could be waived by either parent or child. This propo-
sal would apply only in criminal cases, however, and would be limited to unemancipated
children. Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1024-29.
165. The Canadian Law Reform Commission's proposed evidence code, see generally
Brooks, The Law Reform Commission of Canada's Evidence Code, 16 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
241 (1978), would extend a discretionary form of the traditional marital privilege to per-
sons "related . . . by family or similar ties," PROPOSED EviD. CODE tit. IV, pt. I, § 40 in
LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, supra note 8; id. tit. V, pt. II, § 57, a phrase appar-
ently meant to include parent-child, sibling, and common law marital relationships, id. §
57, Commissioners' Comment. But see id. § 40, Comment by Commissioner La Forest.
The Commission proposes two privileges: § 40 modeled after the marital communications
privilege, § 57 modeled after the marital testimonial privilege. See notes 20-21 supra. In
deciding whether to allow the communications privilege under the Canadian proposal,
the trial judge, having regard for the nature of the relationship, would weigh the proba-
tive value of the evidence and the importance of the question being litigated against the
public interest in privacy, the possible disruption of the relationship, and the harshness
of compelling testimony. In deciding whether to allow the testimonial privilege, the judge
would weigh the probative value of the evidence and the seriousness of the charged
offense against the possible disruption of the relationship and the harshness of compel-
ling testimony. The proposed communications privilege would be available in both civil
and criminal proceedings, while the proposed testimonial privilege would be limited to
criminal proceedings. Like the European privileges, see note 10 supra, both privileges
would protect communications from parent to child in addition to those from child to
parent. A privilege scheme similar to that of the Canadian Law Reform Commission has
been proposed in criminal cases in the Australian state of Victoria. VICTORA LAw REFORM
COMMISSIONER, REPORT ON THE LAW OF EviDENcE RELATING TO THE COMPETENCE AND
COMPELLABILITY OF SPOUSE WITNESSES (1976), noted in 51 AusTL. L.J. 3 (1977).
In addition, some commentators have proposed general discretionary confidential
communication privileges that would encompass the parent-child relationship. These
general approaches all decline to specify in advance which relationships might qualify for
a privilege. Therefore, courts would determine privilege on a case-by-case basis, giving
trial courts even greater discretion than would the Canadian proposal.
One proposal would give qualified protection to confidential communications
between individuals "intimately related or in a position of close personal trust." Krat-
1979] Parent-Child Privilege
that the privilege should not be recognized.
Having the child decide whether to invoke the privilege
would be thoroughly unacceptable. Unless effective control over
the privilege were held by an adult,'" privilege claims not in
the child's best interest would inevitably result."7 In serious
matters of this kind, generally a parent can determine better
than a child what serves the child's best interest. 8 A privilege
tenmaker, supra note 13, at 94, 119. This proposal would specifically protect communica-
tions between parent and child, id. at 83, 93-94, and would require trial courts to make a
case-by-case determination, considering the necessity for the testimony and the avail-
ability of other techniques to better protect the interests of all litigants, id. at 94. The
witness apparently would have to claim the privilege. Id. at 119.
A second general confidential communications proposal would have courts apply
Wigmore's test on a case-by-case basis. McLachlin, Confidential Communications and
the Law of Privilege, 11 U. BRrr. COLUM. L. REv. 266 (1977). The author of the proposal
calls this the "principle" approach, in contrast to the "category" approach, which lists
specific relationships that qualify for a privilege. This "principle" approach would
include a qualified parent-child privilege similar to the Canadian Law Reform Commis-
sion's communications privilege. Id. at 278.
Wigmore's test, however, clearly was not designed to be used in this manner. In fact,
Wigmore used the test to determine whether certain relationships warrant absolute privi-
leges-what McLachlin would call the "category" approach. See Note, supra note 43, at
446. Moreover, the "principle" approach distorts Wigmore's test by applying it too
loosely. Wigmore believed that the four requirements of the test are absolute prerequi-
sites to proper recognition, see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, while the "principle"
approach treats them as merely suggestive guidelines, McLachlin, supra, at 277-78.
A third general confidential communications proposal would abolish all present
privilege statutes and give trial courts virtually unlimited discretion in ruling on privi-
lege claims, directing the courts to consider "the common law, current privilege law, and
their own experience." Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra note 8, at 690. The pro-
posal's author suggests that factors courts could consider include constitutional ramifica-
tions, the general policy behind privileged communications, and the importance of the
communication as evidence in the litigation. Id. at 691-92.
166. Of course, much of this paragraph's "best interest" analysis would not apply if
the privilege were claimed by a child above the age of majority. See People v. Fitzger-
ald, - Misc. 2d _, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Westchester County Ct. 1979) (extending privilege
to 23-year-old son).
167. See In re A & M, 61 A.D.2d at 435 n.9, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 381 n.9; Note, Rights
and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 331-32 (1967); ci.
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (parental decision to admit child to state
mental hospital) ("Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make
sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care or
treatment. Parents can and must make those judgments.").
168. Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1027; Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at
805; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (validity of juvenile's waiver of the privilege
against self-incrimination depends not only on the age of the child, but on the presence
and competence of parents); Commonwealth v. McCutcheon, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669
(1975) (juvenile's confession inadmissible if parent not present).
Letting the child control the privilege would also be inconsistent with state laws
disabling minors to contract, marry, request medical assistance, or buy liquor, see
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
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allowing the child to prevent his parent from testifying would
prevent the parent from providing guidance, discipline, and
direction to the child.'69 In addition, when a parent is willing to
testify, the dissension and repugnance rationales for recognizing
the privilege lose most of whatever validity they otherwise have. 110
Giving control over the privilege to the parent, however,
would lead to equally unsatisfactory consequences. Commenta-
tors generally agree that only the communicator should be able
to waive a confidential communications privilege. 7' A privilege
could not effectively encourage open and honest communications
by children when parents may waive the privilege at will. 7 ' Giving
the child control over the privilege would be necessary to preserve
any hope of encouraging parent-child communication through
the privilege. A privilege waivable by the parent thus would
accomplish nothing except to keep additional relevant evidence
out of trials.
The third possible solution, giving the trial court discretion
to recognize the privilege on a case-by-case basis after weighing
factors such as the quality of the particular parent-child rela-
tionship and the need for the evidence, would be perhaps worst
of all. A discretionary privilege would encourage confidential
communications even less than would an absolute privilege
waivable by the parent. 73 With an absolute privilege, a child,
and dissenting in part), and the purpose behind the legal protection of parental
authority.
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions. More importantly, historically it has recog-
nized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). See Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at
Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 649-50 (1977).
169. Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1028; Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at
804; see Garvey, supra note 107, at 820-22; Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege, supra
note 8, at 685 n.48.
170. Child-Parent Privilege, supra note 8, at 806; cf. Reutlinger, supra note 4, at
1384-85 (same point with regard to marital testimonial privilege).
171. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 83; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§ 2340; Reutlinger, supra note 4, at 1385 n.144; Comment, supra note 10, at 220.
172. Mouths of Babes, supra note 8, at 1027.
173. Cf. Koroway, supra note 38, at 362 (police-informer relationship); Reutlinger,
supra note 4, at 1391 (marital relationship); Robinson, supra note 41, at 923 (discussing
North Carolina's school counselor privilege, under which the judge may compel disclo-
sure, if he believes it necessary to a proper administration of justice) ("The discretionary
feature of this statute does much to negate the value of the privilege granted . . . .Such
a qualified privilege . . . creates uncertainty in the mind of the counselee with respect to
the confidentiality of his communications and thus may serve to undermine the coun-
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knowing his parent, at least could attempt to predict whether
the parent would voluntarily testify. In contrast, with a discre-
tionary privilege a child could not even guess whether an




Although our system of law accords deference to the family,
societal interests at times transcend family interests. Family
members other than spouses traditionally have the same duty as
every other citizen to testify before a grand jury or a court.
Although privacy interests are implicated when the state seeks
access to the content of parent-child communications, neither
sound public policy nor the constitutional right of privacy com-
pels recognition of a parent-child privilege. The testimony of
parents against their children may seem indelicate, especially
when the law exempts spouses from this burden. The available
privilege alternatives, however, are unattractive. An absolute
privilege held by the child surely'would be abused, to the ulti-
mate detriment of the child, while an absolute privilege held by
the parent would give the child no sense of security. A discre-
tionary privilege would lead to unequal justice, and any form of
parent-child privilege would frustrate the search for the truth.
The benefits to be gained from recognition of a parent-child priv-
ilege are simply not worth their price.
Donald Cofer
selor-counselee relationship."); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients:
The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REV. 424, 426 (1970) ("An ad hoc approach to
privilege pursuant to a vague standard achieves the worst of possible worlds: harm in the
particular case because information may be concealed; and a lack of compensating long-
range benefit because persisting uncertainty about the availability of the privilege will
discourage some communications.").
174. A discretionary rule would have several additional undesirable effects. First, by
requiring collateral inquiry into matters such as the quality of the particular parent-child
relationship, a discretionary privilege would tend to slow trials when court calendars are
already clogged. See Anderson, A Criticism of the Evidence Code: Some Practical Con-
siderations, 11 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 163, 176-77 (1977). Next, trial preparation would
be more difficult because attorneys would not know whether witnesses would be required
to testify until after a pretrial hearing to resolve the privilege issues. Id. at 175. Finally,
because the court's privilege determination would be completely ad hoc, effective judicial
review would be difficult, if not impossible, inviting arbitrary and inconsistent decisions
on privilege questions. See Field, A Code of Evidence for Arkansas?, 29 ARK. L. REV. 1, 5
(1975); Walinski & Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: the Case Against,
28 CASE W. RFs. L. REV. 344, 379-82 (1978). With experience, attorneys might "shop" for
a particular judge. Thus, although a discretionary rule in theory would allow the trial
court to maximize justice by examining unique factors in each case, such a rule in prac-
tice likely would bring about less justice than would an absolute rule.
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